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 Interpassivity:  
The necessity to retain a 





First, some questions 
 
What might it mean to interpassively respond to Interpassivity? Is not this 
collection of essays in this special issue itself a potentially doubly 
interpassive event (that is, interpassivity redoubled): delegate others 
firstly, to read the book and secondly, think about – and it is assumed, 
enjoy – the book to the point of writing about it? Of course, to claim that 
these series of events are interpassive is to also claim that many of the 
readers of these essays are in fact “delegating their enjoyment”1 of 
reading Pfaller’s Interpassivity. This delegating of enjoyments signals that 
enjoyment – or perhaps more so – the type of enjoyment delegated is a 
type of action and work in itself. Therefore, that enjoyment so delegated 
can also be a demand upon us that we seek to displace and in 
displacing we seek to replace our own, expected work of enjoyment. So, 
interpassivity – using these essays on the book Interpassivity as an 
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example – is the shift from production to consumption; or rather, is this 
not the consumption of others as displaced and replaced work of and for 
‘you’?   
 
 So, why would we want to outsource enjoyment? The answer is 
we outsource because enjoyment can become a task, a demand – that 
is, work.   In fact, enjoyment is work, but we prefer not to think about it as 
such and rather wish to retain a notion of enjoyment as that able to be 
expressed and enjoyed ‘as in and of itself’. However, this position 
assumes an idealist belief in the possible neutrality of enjoyment. Such a 
belief naively views enjoyment as being able to exist outside of the 
capitalist construction and maintenance of society. In capitalism, 
everything and everyone exists as a cost: a cost to produce, to maintain, 
to access, to be able to appreciate, to take the time to enjoy. Life is work: 
extractive upon and of us. Enjoyment – often taken to be that which may 
exist outside of work life – is in capitalism, work; often unpaid but rather 
paid for in various ways – including monetary access. I am not saying 
that interpassive outsourcing occurs because we understand and agree 
with this, but rather that interpassivity occurs as a type of unthought 
response to our experience of life as and is work. That is, interpassive 
outsourcing is actually a different type of extraction where I get or expect 
others to work in my place.  
 
 There are different types of interpassive outsourcing and here the 
oft-cited example of canned laughter on TV shows is, in my view, not 
necessarily interpassivity because it is not necessarily enjoyment being 
done for us or on our behalf; that is, the canned laughter is not so that we 
do not have to laugh. To signal canned laughter as displaying 
amusement in the place of the viewer is not necessarily interpassivity; 
rather it can signal two things. Firstly, that what is being signaled as 
amusing to the point of laughter is not necessarily so and therefore the 
canned laughter is a type of signaled demand that what is said or done 
on the TV show is worthy of the response of laughter from the viewer. In 
such case it is the demand of enjoyment, not the displacing of it. 
Secondly, consider the shows that often have canned laughter – these 
are shows that may have a didactic approach to the humour presented. 




That is, they are attempting to teach their audience ‘how and when’ to 
laugh and this can be seen the many children’s TV shows that have 
incessant canned laughter in the attempt to signal to and teach their 
young audience when to laugh and what to laugh at. The audience of 
other canned laughter shows are not necessarily children, but they are 
ones that in effect do not trust all of their audience to understand the 
humorous statements or moments. In such cases, what is said or done 
may be still amusing, but not amusing to the point of laughter and so if 
we think about this in interpassive terms, the canned laughter signals an 
acknowledged lack of enjoyment or understanding that is covered up by 
the interpassive laughter, that is the voice of laughter without any 
connection to what is being laughed about.  
 
 In turn, this raises a question about the displaced work of 
enjoyment in interpassivity: how much of interpassivity is neither work 
nor enjoyment but rather a cover up of the expected work or enjoyment 
that does not reach the levels expected or demanded? That is, does 
interpassivity signal a type of ‘lack’ of what is expected but is not done or 
does not occur?   
 
 Yet, if we consider the distinction made by Pfaller between 
interactivity as ideology and interpassivity as theory we can raise the 
question as to whether or not ideology itself is a type of perverse 
interpassivity where you let others (subjects and objects) think in your 
place? Is there a type of pleasure in ideology not that distinct from the 
other pleasures outlined?  Such transference is also not dissimilar to the 
outsourcing of globalization: seeking production that results in a better 
series of options for both those who pursue profit and those seeking 
more consumer choice and consumption. For to have other people and 
things consume for you is to outsource consumption. So, is interpassivity 
analogous to an inverse globalization whereby it is not production that is 
outsourced for consumption but rather consumption outsourced as a 
type of displaced production?  
 
 




The interpassivity of ritual? 
 
It is understandable that Pfaller sees interpassivity as a ritual activity for 
such outsourcing is central to so much ritual: the outsourcing of work, 
the outsourcing of pleasure, the outsourcing of consumption and the 
“staging of the act”2. Associated with the ritual is recognition that 
interpassive acts are illusions not believed in – and this is likewise 
understandable when we appreciate that interpassive illusions do not 
constitute belief but are rather, actions; therefore, is not interpassivity 
often accumulation that displaces work yet occurs as work? The link 
here to ritual occurs because not only do rituals arise out of and also 
reinforce beliefs, but rituals are not pleasure but are work; yet we claim a 
pleasure in rituals in order to separate them from work. But also, rituals 
occur because of a belief in their agency: a belief in agency that we 
disassociate from work. So, we have what can be termed the 
interpassive workers: the priests, the critic, the reviewer, the performer, 
the author – and the theorist and the ideologue: all those who undertake 
the interpassive ritual, action and production to allow the interpassivity of 
others. Our response to their work itself can take on ritual action and 
patterns whereby we maintain the illusion that our response is one of 
pleasure and not of work. In a similar fashion, the Protestant suspicion 
and rejection of ritual itself often took ritualized forms: an illusion of 
response that was neither pleasure nor work. 
 
 It is here too that interpassivity involves a critical engagement with 
religion and religious thought. Pfaller notes “the interpassive dimension of 
all magic”3 in that it “relies, in principle on not believing”.4 That is, magic is 
destroyed by believing – for you can therefore also not believe; rather, 
magic relies on doing and the interpassive illusion of the efficacy of that 
doing. In contrast to not believing, not doing magic does not challenge 
the belief in magic, for not doing does not challenge the doing of magic. 
That is, magic is done or not done, not believed or not believed.  That 
efficacy may also be the interpassivity of not doing; the not doing of 
pleasures in which belief is used to reject enjoyment often in ways 
whereby rationalist and scientific evidence is positioned in opposition to 
enjoyment; or conversely, whereby enjoyment has to be performed as 




the only rational way to produce and consume enjoyment. In this way 
enjoyment becomes work. Similarly, the religious hostility to magic is not 
only the hostility of belief and non-belief (that is, will that ‘doing’ result in 
the doing claimed for it?); but also, the why and how of the rationality of 
‘doing’ and ‘not doing’ which also gives rise to the religious patrolling of 
both orthodoxy and orthopraxis: that is, the right way to think and to act 
that is regarded as the rational ways within that religion. 
 
 Against this we see the return of enchantment in commodity 
fetishism: commodities which rationally are just things but in our 
interpassive response become what, to borrow from Baudrillard, we can 
term as hyper-real signals and promises of the sacred.  But there is a 
limit as to pleasure of the thing if the thing is separated from the self 
because the thing can easily become profaned or, even worse in 
commodity fetishism, the thing can become mundane – that is, of the 
everyday. In becoming mundane, it becomes secularized (of the world of 
shared human experience5) which is even worse than the profanation 
which still allows for a re-engagement – given that profanation relies on 
the sacred for its existence and vice versa. The limit of the sacred thing is 
therefore the problem of the mundane: if the sacred – or the profane – 
becomes mundane then it is reduced back to ‘thing of the world’. 
Because the sacred is that ‘set apart’, in our modern world, it is the self – 
that which we believe can never be reduced to ‘thing of the world’ – that 
is the ultimate expression of the sacred and so is set apart by 
interpassivity. Therefore, we also seek to profane things in order to keep 
the non-thing of self as sacred. Interpassivity can in turn be understood 
as both the fear of the self being profaned and the fear of the self being 
made mundane by the object. Of the two fears, the most feared is the 
mundane self, for the profane self has the possibilities of either being re-
sacralized or continuing to exist as contra-sacred self; but the mundane 
self loses the options of being either sacred or profaned, rather the 
mundane self becomes a self of the everyday. It is this mundane self that 
seeks the interpassive option in order to avoid the realization of the 
mundane nature of the self in the mundane everyday. This is the first way 
to answer the question posited by Pfaller of “why do people not want to 
have their lives and their pleasures?”6; in short, interpassivity is the 




recognition and  the denial – by deferral and avoidance – of the 
mundane self in the mundane world.  
 
 The way in which this interpassive rebellion against the mundane 
self in the mundane word can proceed is, as Pfaller observes, via the 
most mundane activity of all: consumption. Consumption is delegated so 
the individual believes they gain control and agency – but we must also 
remember that the delegation of consumption occurs as a type of 
imposition of the will. Such consumption – by delegated/outsourced 
person or machine – is an act of both collecting and accumulation that 
seeks also to control time; in mundane existence to control time 
becomes a recourse to one of the traditional roles of the sacred: time 
becomes subject to sacred will and intent. But this sacred self also fears 
profanation and this is why pleasure is outsourced out of a puritan fear of 
pleasure as that which may profane the self in some way. Therefore, the 
interpassive response is that of getting you to do my pleasure for me 
because pleasure profanes and is not ‘serious’. So interpassivity is also 
seeking to have others and things profaned in my place. 
 
The sacred self and the secret of interpassivity 
 
This profanation extends now to the work of art that can be neither 
sacred nor mundane but rather must be profaned because traditional 
(“object centred”) arts contain something that should not be included in 
the work, but should be left to the observer”7; but what is this ‘something’? 
It is nothing less than what we might term ‘the sacred’, but because ‘the 
sacred’ is now taken to reside in the ‘sacred self’, the work of art cannot 
be taken to contain this; rather it is the inverse of the ‘sacred’ because the 
work of art is not the self – it is a thing that affirms the sacred self of the 
“new skillful observers (who are for the most part art producers 
themselves)”.8  
 
 The opposite of the sacred self – that which allows the observer to 
reaffirm themselves as sacred – is the profane work of art, only 
identifiable and understandable to the observer who is the sacred self. 
Yet the context for the sacred self who observes is provided by the 




curator who continues the sacred task, acting as liturgist, priest and 
shaman, both creating that which is to be seen and curating how it is to 
be seen.  The result is that the show rather than the art in itself becomes 
the aim because the curator creates the event that ‘guarantees’ pleasure: 
pleasure decided on our behalf and beforehand. What is central to all of 
this is the observer, for without the observer there is no interpassivity 
because without the observer there is no ‘work’ to be delegated that 
could be both profaning and sacralizing. For work in itself is mundane 
and is the action of the mundane worker.  
 
 The ‘secret’ laid bare by interpassivity is that both the sacred and 
profane are nothing more nor less than human acts and potential events 
– not people or things in and of themselves. Rather, sacred and profane 
as acts and events require an observer. We can also understand this 
retuning again to the central example used by Pfaller of canned laughter. 
The programme that uses canned laughter is in one sense laughing 
about itself to prove that it is ‘funny’ within a fear of not being funny and 
the associated identified possibility that the programme may not amuse; 
similarly, the audience is also affirmed by canned laughter that what they 
are observing is ‘funny’. Yet there is also the possible response that the 
observer may feel there is no need to laugh as laughter is being done for 
them because what is being observed is not really funny and certainly 
not funny to the point of eliciting individual, spontaneous laughter. What 
occurs via canned laughter is something mundane that is made profane 
by canned laughter. Yet this profanation of the mundane enables the 
sacred self to retain its sense of sacrality because pleasure profanes; 
better then to let the mundane be profaned and in its profanation 
reinforce its opposition of the sacred. Without canned laughter the 
observer may be drawn into an engagement, a non-deferred encounter 
with that which is mundane – with the risk that the sacred self might be 
recognized as mundane. 
 
 This secret’ means that central to interpassivity is the profanation 
of the mundane; that is the profanation of the everyday as that which is 
positioned as opposite, as inverse to the sacred self. If the sacred self 
takes pleasure in the everyday – that is in the mundane – it finds itself 




associated with that which is neither sacred nor profane. Only by 
delegating pleasure onto that which is not the scared self – that is the 
profane other, the profane thing – can the admitting of pleasure in and of 
the mundane be deferred. This also requires a knowing attitude because 
to delegate pleasure requires one knowing and valuing the pleasure 
being deferred; otherwise there is no pleasure and what could be a 
profanation becomes merely mundane. Why is this important? Because 
of what is done: “interpassive people substitute one act with another by 
investing the latter with psychic energy that was previously bound to the 
first.”9 If that is done without knowing and valuing then the act becomes 
mundane and the one substituting finds their mirror in the unknowing 
and unvalued mundane: they become desacralized. However, by 
knowing and valuing what they are doing, the substitution becomes the 
inverse of the sacred, which is the profane – and the sacred exerts a 
power and will; in other words, there is the expression and retention of 
agency. The pleasures that are delegated or deferred in the interpassive 
act are those that are expressions and reminders of mundane, everyday 
existence. To take personal pleasure in them is to remind oneself that 
one is actually mundane and participates in a mundane reality; but to 
delegate or defer them allows one to maintain the myth of the sacred self 
who can exert agency and will that enables one stand apart from those 
who partake of mundane pleasures. By positioning the pleasures as the 
opposite of the sacred self, such pleasures occur as a profane inversion 
of the sacred self and what it might or might wish to do. Only by 
delegating to the profane other, the other made profane by doing or 
acting my pleasure for me can I maintain my sacred self in the rejected 
reality of the mundane. 
 
 It is here we get to the central interpassive attitude or moment, the 
‘acting as if’ which we can also recognize as the central religious attitude. 
For what is gained by this ‘acting as if’ – as if pleasure is attained, as if 
sacral and profane identity is maintained? What is gained is nothing less 
than a way to confront the mundane absurdity of existence by the 
performance of the ‘acting as if’ whereby ‘as if’ sacralizes and profanes 
mundane existence and the mundane self’. This is why ritual becomes 
central and instructive to interpassivity, for ritual seeks to create and 




maintain a ‘do but do not’ action; that is, the desire of both actions, the 
desire ‘to do’ which is deferred into the desire ‘to do not’ – and so 
contains within it its own prohibition. The outsourcing of the prohibition 
onto the other person or onto the thing becomes a type of ritual to 
maintain the sacrality of that person, for the displaced interpassive ritual 
seeks to maintain the sacrality of the self by the delegation of pleasure.  
For if the sacrality of the self is a fiction maintained by ‘acting as if’ it is not 
a fiction, then the pleasure which makes the sacred self enter into the 
mundane world of other selves and things needs to be displaced – and 
displaced by the ritual it relies upon. To have others and things do that 
which we wish to ‘do but not do’ is to invest the doing – that is the utility 
of gaining or pursuing pleasure – with ritual meaning (a certain pleasure, 
for sure!); but ritual meaning that only by profaning can keep the fiction of 
the sacred self. This is the replacement of the sacred self by the profane 
self: that is, you profane others and things by having then act ‘as if’ for 
you. For if you acted ‘as if’ you would not be profaned, but rather be 
confronted with merely mundane pleasure, action and self. In short, I 
become confronted with the realization that I am like everyone else and 
do everyday things in the everyday like everyone else.    
 
 But questions arise: if I undertake interpassivity do I really know 
and understand what I am doing (a type of magic act) and why I am 
doing it? Or is it, as Pfaller terms it, ‘a magic of the Civilized’?10 What 
breaks the magic spell is the drawing of attention to the fact that the 
civilized is acting ‘as if’ – not acting out of belief but acting ‘as if’ the action 
itself results in the desired outcome. That is, we do it despite rationally 
knowing that it does not and cannot ‘occur’ – knowing this, why is it that 
we continue to pursue the impossible? This is because we are so caught 
up in what we observe or do that rationality ‘disappears’. This is why we 
see the return of ritual that seeks to interpassively maintain a sacred self 
and a profane other or thing through the delegation of pleasure. If we 
consider this rationally then we know there is no sacred self and no 
profane other or thing that we submit to for our pleasure: all we have is 
mundane beings in a mundane world of things – and pleasure neither 
sacralizes nor profanes us. But the illusion of sacred and profane 
requires the civilized magic of interpassivity which we can term rituals of 




the civilized whereby ritual substitutes for belief – whether a Catholic 
ritual of action of a Protestant ritualizing of the word. Ritual frees me of 
the need to believe because the doing of ritual becomes both the point 
of it and the point of that which the ritual is located within. So, whether it 
is ritual action, ritual thought, ritual attitude, the performance of ritual is 
for others so that I do not have to believe; it is the performance of ‘as if’ I 
believe because if I did not believe why would I do the ritual? Therefore, 
we can say that the doing of the ritual is whereby the belief occurs; that is 
belief is a verb undertaken via ritual: ritual action, ritual thought, ritual 




This in turn brings us to the question of participation, for participation 
creates and maintains its own rituals, which are often expressed and 
undertaken as the solution for ‘emancipatory claims’.11 Yet is participation 
emancipatory when it becomes a type of hegemonic demand – whether 
in politics or in art? Does not participation – if it is to be truly 
emancipatory – need to include the option of non-participation, of 
refusal? Yet this non-participation returns us to our central issue because 
non-participation is to challenge the belief of participation as both sacred 
and profane; non-participation is to express the mundane as that in 
which the rituals have no efficacy. It is the mundane which is the location 
and expression of the need and the right not to believe and of the need 
and the right not to undertake ritual. It is the mundane that returns us to 
non-sacred and non-profane beings in a world of mundane things.  
 
 Furthermore, mundane emancipation is emancipation for all: the 
freedom from sacred and profane, the freedom from ritual, freedom from 
the illusion that we need to believe, freedom from the rituals of a sacred 
self created and maintained in response to and via profane others. For 
the demand to join in holds within it a potentially fascist impulse that 
seeks simultaneously to sacralize and to profane: to sacralize certain 
people, nations, things, ideas and to profane other peoples, nations, 
things and ideas, all undertaken via ritual. The fascist privileging of 
spontaneity (often within a reactionary discourse) is a philosophical 




programme of participation: that which, without really thinking, demands 
and acts ‘as if’ it has been thought through. And this is why such 
participation relies on propaganda which aims at “ the dissolving of the 
division of labour between transmission and receivers”12, whereby there is 
no division but rather only participatory consumption. It is this that 
facilitates a narcissistic culture wherein the ‘authentic person’ becomes a 
hegemonic demand and such authenticity is taken to be the expression 
of the sacred self – who, in a fascist ideology, resides in a sacred nation 
of sacred people with and for a sacred purpose; which is really a 
rejection of mundane existence and identity ‘as if’ one is set apart as 
‘sacred’. This is why we see the return of ritual in the contemporary world 
as ‘spontaneous’ expression of participation ‘as if’ such expression 
performs both sacred meaning and profane identification: for the only 
way “one is able to show others what he or she is not”13 is to profane 
others and things and spaces.  
 
 Whether in art practice, event and expression or in everyday life, to 
profane is the rejection of the opportunity for “a critical reading: it is no 
longer possible to inquire into whether something quite different is being 
said” than what the sacred person who profanes (who is also often an 
artist – of art or politics) “intended to say”.14 For to question the profaning 
is to question the sacrality of the one who profanes – and in a narcissistic 
culture of fascist ideology there is the rejection of the everyday mundane 
as the place from which to question and critique. (I note here the way a 
narcissistic culture of liberal identity politics operates in very similar way 
to the narcissistic culture of fascist ideology. The difference is that 
fascism stands in the name of ‘some’ [albeit horrible] truth)15. 
 
 The fascist demand of participation is also the drive for 
community: “the place where only those who are physically present can 
profit – a limited number of people who almost know each other”16 – or 
who organize the ‘spontaneous’ expression of participation and ritual that 
sacralizes them against the profane.  So what can be done? We have to 
be aware of and sure of what we can offer. Against the community of 
sacred and profane, we have the society of the mundane; against the 
fascist demand we have the democratic offer.  





 Conclusion  
 
We find ourselves in a demanded community of postmodern fascism, 
that only wants the illusions it can fully believe and the complete 
identification of the community with these illusions.17  This also means 
identity politics is nothing more nor less than the illusion of the sacred 
self who is at risk from profane others who do not believe in oneself and 
one’s sacrality. So, we experience the fascist retreat into tribes with their 
demand of participation and the patrolling of the boundaries of pure and 
true identity. The result is seeking of control and order, a willingness to be 
told what to do, to welcome bans and prohibitions so that the individual, 
the group, the tribe, the community can maintain their sacred self. That 
and those banned and prohibited are those things and people believed 
to profane – and it is this that results in the delegation of antipassivity: the 
outsourcing of the pleasure that could profane me so that it now 
profanes others.  Perhaps what we need to recover is the ability to act, 
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